the EU in the run up to the Brexit referendum and the position of the UK's financial industry during the Brexit campaign and after the referendum. Finally, we review the post Brexit options available to manage the relationship between the UK and the EU, specifically with regard to finance.
It is argued that that the UK has been a key player in the development of the single financial market, especially prior to the international financial crisis, and has greatly benefited from it.
The -at times considerable -British influence made EU financial regulation more marketfriendly and open to third countries than it would have been otherwise. Post-crisis, British policy-makers and the financial industry were -at least temporarily --on their back foot.
The EU-UK agreement signed prior to the Brexit referendum contained several clauses concerning economic governance, including non-discrimination provisions for the financial industry based in the UK. However, these provisions mainly reflected the status quo and restated existing commitments. The City of London and British financial industry were mostly in the pro-Remain camp during the referendum campaign -albeit there were some noteworthy financial sector supporters of Brexit. Following the June referendum, the City unsuccessfully mobilised in order to retain full access to the single financial market -the alternative options were considerably less appealing for the UK financial industry.
I. The UK, the single financial market and EU financial regulation
The further integration of the Single Market in financial services, which regained momentum with the Financial Services Action Plan in 1999, was characterised by the presence of two competing coalitions: the 'market-making' one, which was led by the UK, and included Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the Scandinavian member states; and the 'marketshaping' one, which focused upon re-regulating the market at the EU level and which included France, Germany, Italy, Belgium and the other Mediterranean countries. The UK (Posner and Véron, 2010) , the City of London and the most competitive part of the financial industry on the continent (Mügge, 2010) were the main driving forces for further financial market integration because they were the interests that would mostly benefit from it. Hence, pre-crisis EU financial regulation was strongly influenced by the UK -as suggested by the prevailing market-making content of the four so-called Lamfalussy directives, the Solvency II directive and the Payment Systems directive -even if certain provisions of these pieces of legislation could be described as market-shaping.
What accounts for the UK's influence on financial market integration and pre-crisis EU financial regulation? First, the UK was the second or third largest EU member state in terms of GDP. Second, the UK had voting power: under QMV voting rules in the Council, the four largest member states (Germany, France, the UK and Italy), together with any other EU member state, had sufficient votes to block any proposed pieces of legislation on finance.
Most importantly though, the UK financial sector was by far the largest in the EU and the City of London was the largest financial centre in Europe and the second largest in the world.
Given the size of the financial sector -in particular when compared to the rest of the economy (Macartney, 2009 -British authorities had considerable subject-specific expertise on matters related to finance and were regarded by many policy makers and stakeholders as providing state-of-the-art regulation (Mügge, 2010) . Moreover, British policy-makers invested a considerable amount of technical and human resources in order to shape the regulatory debate in the EU (Posner and Véron, 2010; Quaglia, 2010) . In addition, the UK hosted large banks, including large US banks, that had the resources to lobby policy makers both domestically and at the EU-level (Baker, 2010; Helleiner, 2010) .
In the wake of the international financial crisis, the UK's influence on EU financial governance waned somewhat, at least in the short term. A host of new financial legislation was issued by the EU in the aftermath of the crisis. The vast majority of these measures regulated activities or entities that were previously unregulated (or subject to self-regulation) in the EU and its member states (including credit rating agencies) (Quaglia, 2010 ); or at the EU level (such as hedge funds and bank resolution) (Buckley and Howarth, 2011) ; or at the national, EU and international level (over the counter derivatives) (Pagliari, 2011) . In other instances, legislation imposed heavier, more prescriptive and more burdensome requirements on financial entities that were already regulated prior to the crisis -as in the case of higher capital requirements for banks and new liquidity management rules (the Capital Requirements Directive IV) ) -or they set in place more substantial protection for depositors (the revised Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive) . The reform of the financial services architecture following the de Larosière Report (2009) was designed to strengthen financial supervision at the EU level and to foster macro-prudential supervision in the EU (Hennessy, 2014) .
Unlike the period prior to the international financial crisis, most EU regulation adopted from 2009 to 2016 was market-shaping rather than market-making. Hence, the UK was often a foot-dragger, for example concerning the legislation on hedge funds, rating agencies and the Financial Transaction Tax. These pieces of legislation were resisted by the UK by Labour and Conservative-led governments on the grounds that they would impose unnecessary costs, damage the competitiveness of the financial industry in Europe and reduce the attractiveness of European financial centres as a result of regulatory arbitrage. The concern about international 'regulatory arbitrage' has traditionally been at the forefront of policy-makers' minds in Britain, given the fact that London hosts many non-British-owned financial institutions and successfully competes with other financial centres worldwide to attract business (Quaglia, 2010) . Indeed, the British government's influence on the content of EU post-crisis financial regulation proved to be important in order to maintain the single financial market open to third countries (Pagliari, 2013; Quaglia, 2015) . Equivalence rules were the cornerstone of the post-crisis regulatory approach of the EU towards third countries in finance. All the main 'equivalence clauses'. These clauses stipulate that unless third country rules are equivalent to EU rules, foreign firms providing services in the EU or doing business with EU counterparts will be subject to EU regulation in addition to their home country regulation. Without equivalence, foreign firms failing to respect EU regulations would be blocked from accessing the Single Market.
For policy-makers in countries such as France and Germany, which embraced a 'marketshaping' regulatory paradigm, the equivalence clauses were first and foremost intended to prevent the 'import' into the EU of financial instability from third countries. These clauses were also seen as instrumental in seeking to align third country rules with EU rules. By contrast, British policy-makers, who traditionally supported a 'market-making' regulatory approach, worried about the potential risk of closing the EU market to third country entities and products as well as the detrimental effects that the new EU equivalence rules could have on the competitiveness of the financial sector in the EU. For British policy-makers, loose equivalence rules were needed above all to ensure the access of third country financial entities and products managed from London to the EU market.
The UK was by and large supportive of Banking Union and specifically the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for euro area member states, notably as a way to tackle the sovereign debt crisis distressing the euro area periphery and to ensure financial stability therein.
1 However, the British government had no intention of participating in Banking Union because of domestic political and political economy considerations. Banking Union implied a considerable pooling of power at the EU / Banking Union level -first and foremost the supranationalisation of banking supervision -which was politically unacceptable in the UK.
Moreover, the institutional and decision-making framework of Banking Union was primarily designed for euro area members. While designed to be open to the participation (through 'close cooperation' provisions) of non-euro area countries, none to date has yet to join Banking Union. As for its domestic political economy, the British banking system was -and by a large margin -the most 'Europeanized' of the largest six EU member state banking systems in terms of the holdings of other EU-headquartered banks in the UK (as both a percentage and in total terms) as well as British bank holdings elsewhere in the EU (in total terms). The British banking system was also by far the most internationalized in terms of non-EU headquartered banks active in the UK and the activities of British banks abroad . The UK was most exposed to the potential instability of globally systemic banks, which affected the British banking system more in relative terms than others in Europe . British banks by and large supported the creation of the SSM, but none sought British participation (BBA, 2012 . The end of the UK's membership of the EU is likely to weaken the bargaining position within the EBA of those supervisors from member states outside of Banking Union.
Finally, the UK was a pace-setter on Capital Markets Union (CMU) very much in the same way it had been on financial market integration over the previous two decades . First, a British national, Jonathan Hill was chosen to lead the CMU project at the European Commission and was appointed as Commissioner 'for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union'. Second, UK policy-makers and stakeholders engaged extensively in the agenda setting process on CMU. Third, the areas prioritised for action by the Commission -securitization (banking), Solvency II (insurance) and Prospectus (securities markets company information) -were those that would clearly benefit British interests and, indeed, had been previously set by the UK government as its three top priorities for action on CMU (UK Government, 2015) . The call for evidence on the EU regulatory framework for financial services also chimed well with British concerns regarding EU overregulation as the reaction to the international financial crisis.
Of all EU Member States, the UK had the most potentially to benefit from the financial liberalisation and diversification promised in the CMU project, given the diversity of its financial sector and, in particular, the high concentration of wholesale market activity, private equity and hedge funds in the City (Véron, 2014) . In a speech made to the City of London Corporation Policy Committee, Commissioner Hill (2015) noted that:
[f]rom here investment flows out across the continent: UK banks lend more than $2 trillion into other European countries…. More than a third of UK private equity funds' investments go to companies elsewhere in the EU. So the success of the City is tied to a successful Europe.
Given the fact that the UK was one of the main cheerleaders of CMU, the UK's departure is likely to have negative implications for this project.
II. The EU-UK agreement prior to the Brexit referendum
In February 2016, the EU Member States engaged in a re-negotiation of the terms of the UK membership of the EU with the aim of reaching an agreement which could aid British Prime
Minister David Cameron's efforts to win the referendum by clarifying or resolving certain politically sensitive matters. On 2 February, European Council President, Donald Tusk, presented a proposal for an agreement to address a range of specific concerns raised by Mr.
Cameron (Tusk, 2016) . After negotiations among the Member States and between officials of the European Council and European Parliament, the agreement was approved by all EU leaders as a 'legally binding and irreversible decision' at the European Council session in Brussels on 18-19 February (European Council, 2016) . The changes were to take effect after the British referendum, if the 'Remain' vote prevailed. The re-negotiation agreement contained five clauses with reference to European economic governance which largely restated the status quo. However, a small number of new 'safeguards' were inserted.
Clause 1: 'Discrimination … based on the official currency of the Member State … is prohibited. Legal acts … directly linked to the functioning of the euro area shall respect the internal market … and shall not constitute a barrier to or discrimination in trade between Member States. These acts shall respect the competences, rights and obligations of Member States whose currency is not the euro' (European Council, 2016, p. 13 ).
This clause stated what was already de jure and de facto the case. The principal concern that this clause addressed was the impact of British non-membership of the euro area upon the challenge. The ECJ ruled that the ECB was acting beyond its competence by attempting to direct most clearing of euro-denominated financial products to the euro area.
While the illegality of the ECB's efforts was clarified, the ECJ did not decide on the financial stability versus internal market concerns per se. Thus there remained the possibility that financial stability concerns could trump efforts to preserve the internal market. Furthermore, the ECB's action left a nasty aftertaste and a very real (and very valid) fear that some member states and some EU institutions continued to see the balance between financial stability concerns and the need to respect the internal market very differently than the British government. However, on this issue, the underlying concern of UK-located counterparty clearers potentially lacking sufficient liquidity in a crisis was resolved through swap arrangements between the ECB and the Bank of England. Clause 2 was also re-statement of both current legal fact and de facto reality. However, the clause appears to exaggerate the singleness of the single rulebook on banking. Even in the SSM, in its direct supervision of the largest euro area banks, the ECB was required to operate supervision according to the rules of the participating member states. The ECB had counted 122 options and national discretions in the application of EU rules on banks and their supervision. The ECB sought to reduce the scope of these options / discretions but with many this would likely take a long time and with some options / discretions full convergence was very unlikely.
With regard to non-Banking Union member states (including the UK), they were still subject to the Single Rulebook and efforts at convergence and harmonization. However, here the EU (through the EBA) had fewer powers and less suasion than the ECB to bring about convergence in supervisory practice. Another crucial point to make is that the SSM's supervisory manual / and supervisory practice had to conform to the EBA's technical standards -not the other way around. This is because the SSM had to respect the rules of the internal market. The UK had more wiggle room with regard to the transposition / implementation of European standards than did the SSM national competent (supervisory) authorities which were under direct ECB pressure to modify a range of their distinctive national rules on banking and supervisory practices than were British authorities.
The double majority voting rule of the EBA was unique in EU law / policy-making and meant, in effect, that a UK vote on EBA decisions weighed more heavily with regard to supervisory standards in the EU (and thus the SSM) than the vote of individual Banking Union member states, including Germany, France and Italy. In 2016, five out of nine noneuro member states could block EBA decisions, whereas it took ten out of nineteen euro area member states to block decisions. This was egregious because it introduced a de facto qualified majority voting which had no relationship to national population or economy size.
Double majority voting in the EBA would remain until the number of member states outside
Banking Union dropped to four -a rule which created the potential situation in which three member states (regardless of size) could legally block decisions sought by the other 25.
Clause 3. 'Emergency and crisis measures designed to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area will not entail budgetary responsibility for Member States whose currency is not the euro, or, as the case may be, for those not participating in the banking union. Appropriate mechanisms to ensure full reimbursement will be established where the general budget of the Union supports costs, other than administrative costs, that derive from the emergency and crisis measures referred to in the first subparagraph' (European Council, 2016, p. 14) .
This clause was, to a very large extent, a re-statement of the legal and de facto reality that power to a bloc of euro area member states and being potentially forced to pay out to help euro area member states in trouble (Open Europe, 2016) . Unlike the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) (which is the main funding mechanism of the euro area for both sovereigns and banks) the EFSM is a Commission mechanism that can be used to support all the EU member states (and not just the euro area member states). The EFSM can raise up to €60 billion by issuing debt and the reimbursement of this debt is guaranteed by EU budget.
The creation of the EFSM thus entailed a potential budgetary responsibility for Member
States outside the euro area, and specifically the UK government. However, the likelihood of a euro area member state imposing a financial burden on the UK government was exceedingly limited. First, the bulk of European support for euro area member states needing financial assistance came from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to which the UK did not contribute capital. Second, the EFSM raised funds on the markets. These funds were guaranteed by the European Commission using the budget of the EU as collateral. Thus, in theory, if a euro area member state failed to pay back the loans from this mechanism (offered at comparatively generous terms) then the EU budget could take a hit. However, the impact would only be on contributions to the EU budget to which MS have already committed themselves. Funds to cover EFSM debt incurred would have to be taken from other parts of the EU budget. The UK government would not be expected to pay more and, at most, the UK net contribution to the EU budget would only increase slightly given the potential decrease of funds allocated to other EU programmes from which the UK also benefitted. Thus, the impact upon the UK government of EFSM financial support was unlikely and the clause added to the agreement on the UK and the EU provided a guarantee that was unlikely ever to be called upon. It is also important to note that the bulk of the EFSM's total funding (€46.8 billion out of a possible €60 billion) had previously been lent to Ireland and Portugal and that these loans had been supported by the UK government.
Clause 4. 'The implementation of measures, including supervision or resolution of financial institutions and markets, and macro-prudential responsibilities, to be taken in view of preserving the financial stability of Member States whose currency is not the euro is … a matter for their own authorities and own budgetary responsibility, unless such Member States wish to join common mechanisms open to their participation' (European Council, 2016, p. 14) .
This clause re-stated the existing situation both de jure and de facto. Again, this clause re-stated the existing situation both de jure and de facto. If anything, it might have even exaggerated the importance of the Euro Group which had no legal decision making powers and operates as an informal decision making body (Puetter, 2013) . However, yet again, it is important to insist upon the significant differences among most euro area member states on most policy areas (fiscal policy, etc.) which made it unlikely that important decisions would be taken in Euro Group discussions on internal market matters that also affected the non-euro area member states. In any event, these decisions were subject to subsequent intergovernmental discussion in the Council (Ecofin).
The Quid Pro Quo?
The final point to make on the European Council's economic governance provisions is that the agreement on the UK could be seen as having potentially reduced British government power in policy making on economic governance. The first clause of these provisions noted that:
'Member States whose currency is not the euro shall not impede the implementation of legal acts directly linked to the functioning of the euro area and shall refrain from measures which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of economic and monetary union' (European Council, 2016, p. 13).
Again, the wording of the clause largely reflected the status quo. However, the new obligation of having to refrain 'from measures that could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of EMU' might have been significant. The creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 2012 can be taken by way of example. It was necessary to create the ESM though an intergovernmental treaty because the UK government had refused EU treaty change. These new provisions might have been invoked to prevent the UK from blocking the future incorporation of the ESM into the EU treaties. According to the report: up to 50 per cent of EU-related activity (£20 billion in revenue) and an estimated 35,000 jobs could be at risk, along with £5 billion of tax revenues per annum.
III. The British financial industry and the Brexit vote
Furthermore, the knock-on impact on the broader economic system risked losses of £14-18 billion of revenue, 34-40,000 jobs and £5 billion in tax revenue per annum (Wyman, 2016) . 
Full Brexit: UK-EU relations regulated by WTO rules
According to this model, EU-UK relations would be regulated by WTO rules, which prescribe, amongst other things, the 'most favourite nation' clause, according to which countries cannot discriminate between their trading partners. Thus, if one country grants another country special conditions (such as a lower customs duty rate for one of their products), it has to do the same for all other WTO members. In the WTO model, some tariff barriers, customs barriers and non-tariff (regulatory) barriers would remain between the EU and the UK, unless the UK adopted EU rules (or UK rules were considered as equivalent to EU rules). UK firms would not have the right of establishment in the EU; and they would not 11 The Guardian, 27 November 2016.
be able to passport their services, including financial services, across the EU. However, the freedom of capital movement would be retained. Foreign direct investments into the UK could potentially take a hit because the UK has been an important point of entry into the EU Single Market, especially in finance. In fact, many US-headquartered banks set up branches and subsidiaries in London, and from there they operated throughout the EU. The UK would not be able to access the Court of Justice of the EU, and UK-EU dispute settlement would take place through the WTO. The UK would be free to negotiate new bi and multi-lateral trade agreements and would not have to pay contributions to the EU budget and EU programmes. This was the option most politically palatable for the 'Leave Campaign' and pro-Brexit government ministers, but it was also the most potentially expensive from an economic point of view, especially for the UK financial sector.
UK joins the EEA (the so-called Norway option)
If the UK joined the EEA, it would retain membership of and hence unrestrained access to the Single Market, including the passport for financial services. However, the UK would have to comply with EU rules (or UK rules should be considered by the EU as equivalent to EU rules Bilaterals are complex and time-consuming, the EU is not keen to replicate the Swiss option with the UK. Indeed, even prior to the Brexit referendum, the EU expressed dissatisfaction with the Swiss deal, questioning the continuation of this arrangement. This option -subject to the details eventually agreed -would not be politically costly for the UK and it was seen as a good potential deal for the City, which indeed advocated a 'Swiss plus deal'. However, this option would be politically costly for the EU. Any 'special deal' for the UK financial services sector would give the UK important benefits of EU membership, but not many of the obligations deriving from it.
The British authorities and the UK financial sector faced a 'dilemma' in the upcoming Brexit negotiations. On the one hand, if the UK loses unrestricted access to the single financial market, UK-based financial entities and activities will need to relocate at least some activities to subsidiaries in the EU in order to continue to benefit from passporting across the Single Market (that applies to the full range of financial services). Moreover, the UK will no longer serve as the main point of entry into the EU for third country financial entities and products, which will be more likely therefore to seek to choose to place a range of operations in other EU Member States to secure access to the passport. Finally, the UK will be less able to challenge the efforts of the ECB and a number of Member States to transfer euro clearing to the euro area.
On the other hand, if unrestricted access to the single financial market is retained, the UK will have to continue to comply with EU financial regulation on which it ceases to have a direct say in policy-and law making. In the past, the UK financial sector frequently complained about excessively burdensome EU financial regulation. As this contribution has argued, in several financial policy areas, the UK has yielded considerable influence in 'calibrating' (at times, toning down) EU financial rules. Hence, EU financial regulation is likely to be different in the future without the UK's 'market-making' approach -this will make EU rules less suitable for the financial industry based in the City. Moreover, euro area member states will tend to develop specific preferences on binding technical standards on supervision and potentially financial regulation more generally through their cooperation in Banking Union.
The EU also faces a Brexit dilemma. Any 'special deal' for the UK financial services sector is politically unpalatable for the EU because it would give the UK important benefits of EU membership, namely, unrestricted access to the single financial market, including passporting. It would be the kind of 'pick and choose' approach that has so far been ruled out by the EU -whereas the UK authorities have tended to speak of a 'bespoke deal'. There might also be a political trade-off among the four freedoms, in particular the movement of labour (including control of immigration) and the free circulation of financial services and capital. At the same time, the City is by far the main financial centre in Europe, so there are incentives to retain it in the Single Market -and even some press reports that the Commission has been exploring this option. 12 Furthermore, many continental banks, insurers, securities dealers, and so on, operate in London and face potential costs in having to move operations.
Equivalence and passporting
In addition to the choice among the three macro-models described above, two other Directive (Bank of England, 2016) .
12 See, for example, The Guardian, 13 January 2017.
Certain pieces of EU financial legislation contain provisions for 'equivalence'. There are currently nearly 40 equivalence requirements in place in total (Open Europe, 2016) .
Equivalence stipulates that if third country rules are equivalent to EU rules, foreign firms providing services in the EU or doing business with EU counterparts can continue to be subject to their home country regulation in lieu of EU regulation (see Quaglia, 2015) .
Equivalence is outcome-based -that is, the regulations of the third country do not need to replicate EU legislation word-by-word as long as they achieve the same objectives -and can bestow passport-like rights in some cases. Equivalence is granted to countries not to individual firms, as in the case, for example, of substitute compliance in the US. The
Commission decides on the equivalence of third countries on the basis of advice from the European Supervisory Authorities -the EBA, the ESMA and the EIOPA. However, EU's equivalence only covers a narrow range of services; it can be withdrawn at any time; and its approval is generally a political rather than a technical process, which does not bode well for contribution has examined the mobilisation of the financial industry in the run up to the referendum and subsequently. Finally, the various options for EU-UK relations, specifically with regard to the financial sector, have been examined.
As for the effects of Brexit, given the strong internal and external market-making influence exerted by the UK in the past, one could expect that EU financial regulation in the future will become more market-shaping, and less market-friendly. The Single Market in finance is also likely to be somewhat less open to third countries, after the UK's departure. In turn, Brexit represents a major challenge for the UK financial sector and the finance-led model of capitalism in the UK. Brexit will have an impact on the size and profitability of the sector, as well as its contribution to the real economy. The precise impact remains to be seen and will depend largely on the progress of Brexit negotiations starting in 2017.
